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Abstract 
Income from corporate and noncorporate firms is treated very differently under 
the tax law. In theory, given existing tax law, the noncorporate sector should consist 
of very profitable firms owned by low-tax-bracket investors and firms with tax losses 
owned by high-tax-bracket investors. But the degree to which firms change their 
form of organization in response to taxes, and the resulting excess burden, depends 
as well on nontax factors. Given the role of taxes, we estimate what size the nontax 
advantage to incorporating must take in each industry so that the forecasted choices 
for organizational form, aggregated over investors in different tax brackets, are 
consistent with the aggregate evidence. While the estimated nontax costs are large in 
some industries, noncorporate activity tends to be concentrated where the costs are 
small, leading to little excess burden from the tax distortion to organizational form. 
JEL Classification: H25; D23; G32 
1. Introduction 
Income from an incorporated firm is treated very differently than income 
from an unincorporated firm under U.S. tax law. Corporate income is fully 
taxable under the corporate income tax, and partially taxable under the 
personal income tax, whereas noncorporate income faces only the personal 
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income tax. Given the progressivity of personal income tax rates, the 
relative tax treatment of corporate vs. noncorporate income depends in 
large part on the identity of the owners. To what degree does the 
distribution of firms across forms of organization respond to these differ- 
ences in tax treatment? What are the efficiency costs that result from the 
tax-induced changes in the forms of organization chosen by firms? 
In two recent papers, Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989, 1990) used simulation 
models to estimate the degree to which firms’ choices of organizational form 
should have changed due to differences between the corporate rate and a 
representative personal tax rate,* and forecast that the effects have been 
very large. MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1991) examined empirically the 
degree to which the observed fractions of business income or business assets 
in corporate and noncorporate firms has changed over time in response to 
changes in the average tax rates faced on corporate vs. noncorporate 
income. Income and assets clearly shifted in response to changing tax 
incentives, but the estimated effects were small. 
All these papers suffer from the problem that the difference in average 
tax rates provides a poor summary of the tax distortions to organizational 
form choices. Under existing tax incentives, the noncorporate sector should 
consist of very profitable firms owned by investors in low tax brackets and 
firms with tax losses owned by investors in high tax brackets.* As a result, a 
tax change that narrows the distribution of personal tax rates while leaving 
the average tax rate unchanged would reduce the tax advantage faced by all 
noncorporate firms. The level and distribution of the taxable rate of return 
across firms also matters, since tax distortions matter only to the extent to 
which there is income subject to tax. 
In this paper, we develop the theory of the equilibrium allocation of assets 
between corporate and noncorporate firms more fully. Firms, in deciding on 
organizational form, must take into account nontax as well as tax factors.3 
The degree to which firms respond to tax incentives depends on the 
importance of these nontax factors. Under a variety of simplifying assump- 
tions, we are able to estimate the value of these nontax factors from 
aggregate data on assets and income of corporate and noncorporate firms, 
and from information on the distribution of assets across individual tax 
1 For a much earlier discussion of the tax distortion to organizational form, see Feldstein and 
Slemrod (1980). 
* Firms with tax losses have been an important enough component of the noncorporate sector 
that aggregate noncorporate income in the United States was negative during the early to mid 
198Os, a situation that cannot be explained by the earlier papers since in these papers the 
noncorporate tax rates were always below the corporate rate. 
3 As an example of these nontax factors, corporate but not noncorporate firms automatically 
face limited liability and can list their shares on the public exchanges, in principle making it 
much easier for them to raise funds from a large number of outside investors. 
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brackets. The basic intuition is as follows: investors trade off any tax savings 
from investing in a noncorporate firm, given their tax bracket, with the 
nontax costs of doing so. Given some assumed size of the nontax costs of 
operating in the noncorporate form, we model the optimal portfolio 
holdings in corporate vs. noncorporate firms for investors in each tax 
bracket. We can then infer how high the nontax costs must have been to 
make the forecasted fraction of noncorporate holdings in each industry 
match the observed fraction. We describe the formal model implementing 
this intuition in Section 2, and derive the resulting empirical estimates in 
Section 3. 
On average, the estimated nontax costs of noncorporate ownership are 
positive and sizeable: a representative firm would pay costs each year equal 
to almost 4% of its equity value by being noncorporate vs. corporate. In 
Section 3, we discuss the consistency of these estimates of the nontax costs 
of operating in noncorporate form with forecasts from the theoretical 
literature on organizational forms. 
In Section 4 we use our estimates to explore the implications of 
eliminating the separate corporate tax and instead making each sharehol- 
der’s share of corporate income taxable under his/her personal income tax, 
as occurs with noncorporate firms. On average, the efficiency gains from the 
resulting changes in organizational form are forecasted to be only about 9% 
of the taxes initially collected on business income. In contrast, Gravelle and 
Kotlikoff (1989) estimate the efficiency cost from differential taxation to be 
about 120% of initial tax revenue. 
We relied on many simplifying assumption in the analysis. In Section 5, 
we discuss possible biases that may result, and report some estimates of the 
magnitude of these biases. The main findings of the paper are summarized 
in Section 6. 
2. Model of the equilibrium allocation across organizational forms 
The model has two period.’ In the first period, firms choose their form of 
organization and individuals invest in ownership shares in firms. In the 
second period, firms earn a random return on their investments, taxes are 
4 This is the cost averaged across both years and industries. Since noncorporate activity is 
concentrated in industries where these costs are lower, however, a representative noncorporate 
firm has only a 1.66% lower rate of return by remaining noncorporate. 
5 Our results would immediately generalize to a multiperiod setting as long as there are no 
transactions costs of changing organizational form, so that the decision problem is time 
separable. For a discussion of the implications of transactions costs for our analysis, see Section 
5. 
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paid both by firms and by individual owners on this income, and the owners 
consume what is left net of taxes. 
There are Z different industries in the economy, each with a constant- 
returns-to-scale production technology. For each dollar invested in a 
diversified set of corporations in industry i, the resulting economic income 
earned in the second period is ,a random variable fi, while the resulting 
taxable income is denoted by Yi. (The ex ante distribution of returns is 
assumed to be the same for all corporations in an industry.) Let gi denote 
the difference, c - Ft. Corporations are subject to a corporate tax at rate 
7, implying corporate tax payments of T?~ in the second period.6 
In addition, corporate equity income is subject to personal taxes. If paid 
out as dividends, the income is taxed at the investor’s full personal tax rate, 
which we denote as mb for an investor in tax bracket b. If retained by the 
firm, it creates a capital gain for investors, which bears a lower rate of tax 
due to both exclusion provisions and the deferral advantages of paying the 
tax at realization rather than upon accrual of the capital gain. On net, 
corporate equity income bears an effective combined marginal tax rate 
which we denote by ebi that varies both with the investor’s tax bracket and 
with the (exogenous) dividend payout rate of the industry. We denote the 
resulting combined tax rate by Tag, where zbi = T + e&l - r). The net income 
earned on this investment is therefore’ YT - rbiFi = Fi(l - Tag) + ki. 
Investors could instead invest the same dollar in the noncorporate sector 
in industry i. The rate of return earned by noncorporate firms will differ to 
the extent that nontax factors put noncorporate firms at an economic 
disadvantage. In addition, given the lack of public trading of shares in 
noncorporate firms and the fact that partnerships are required to refile with 
the state if their ownership structure changes, investors would find it much 
more difficult to obtain a diversified portfolio of noncorporate firms in the 
industry. To capture these effects, we assume that the economic income 
earned in the second period on a dollar invested in the first period in the 
noncorporate sector in industry i equals q - C, + 6. Here, Ci measures the 
expected nontax costs of using the capital in the noncorporate sector,’ while 
6 captures any noise in the size of nontax costs as well as the added risk 
from having a less well-diversified portfolio. Thus, we allow corporate and 
6 For simplicity, we ignore the progressivity in the corporate tax law, so assume that 7 does 
not vary as a function of p,. There was little alternative, given that we are dealing with 
aggregate rather than firm data. 
‘For simplicity, we ignore any personal taxes on the income 2, both here and for 
noncorporate firms. Tax liability, if any, on this income should take the form of personal capital 
gains taxes. (Given the General Utilities Doctrine, corporate capital gains taxes should be 
avoidable.) Since capital gains tax liabilities are low and unaffected by the choice of 
organizational form, for simplicity we ignored them. 
’ C, need not be positive. 
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noncorporate returns to differ both in expected value and in variance. By 
assumption, 4 has variance ~2, and is independent of all other random 
variables in the model. For simplicity, the definition of taxable income is 
assumed to be the same for corporate and noncorporate firms9 except that 
the expected nontax costs, Ci, of operating in the noncorporate sector are 
assumed to be fully tax-deductible.” We assume that 6 is in the form of 
capital gains, and ignore any resulting taxJabilities. Therefore, the resulting 
taxable income in the second period is Yi - Ci. If the individual owner of 
this income is in tax bracket mb, then the resulting net-of-tax income is” 
pT - cj + 6 - mb( c - Ci) = (1 - q)( c - C,) + 2i + 6. 
What are the nontax costs (or benefits) of employing capital in the 
noncorporate sector? The two main costs commonly suggested are first that 
noncorporate owners face unlimited liability for claims against the firm, and 
second that they cannot trade ownership shares in public markets. Precisely 
why these are costs for noncorporations is somewhat disputed.12 Nonethe- 
less, it is clear that some costs are offsetting the tax benefits of noncorporate 
form, or we would see far fewer corporations. Indeed, the statistical 
evidence in MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1991) suggests that the nontax 
costs are more important in aggregate than the tax effects. 
Individual investors make their investment decisions in the first period. In 
this period, individuals can invest in corporate or noncorporate shares in any 
industry, or else in a risk-free asset earning a real rate of return rz - rr, and 
a taxable rate of return of rz.13 Denote the amount invested in corporate 
(noncorporate) capital in industry i by investors in tax bracket b by azi(qij). 
Allocation decisions are-made so as to maximize a mean-variance utility 
function: U =f(1,, var(Z,)), where Z, is the outcome for second-period 
9 For further discussion, see Section 5. 
lo Our estimates of C, in the next section will be too high if in fact the C, are nondeductible. 
In Section 5 we indicate the size of this possible bias. 
I1 Note that here, and in our prior measure of net corporate income, we assume full loss 
offset. While not strictly available, this seems a reasonable first approximation. In particular, 
noncorporate owners can deduct losses against other sources of income (e.g. wages, other 
partnership or portfolio income). Corporations with losses can in principle merge with 
profitable corporations (perhaps in other industries), and deduct their losses against the other 
firms’ profits. For a discussion of what biases may be created by this simplifying assumption, see 
Section 5. 
‘*Note that limited liability is only the default rule, and does not prevent firms from 
contracting around it. Owners of small corporations routinely post personal assets as collateral 
for financing, and noncorporations routinely enter contracts that limit their liabilities. However, 
the transactions costs of recontracting may be high, limiting the amount of recontracting. For 
instance, Katz (1990) shows that if it is costly to contract around the default, even slightly so, 
adverse selection will prevent anyone from doing so. 
I3 In the empirical work, we set r, equal to the nominal Treasury Bill rate and rr equal to the 
inflation rate. 
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income for investors in tax bracket mb, and & is its expectation. Following 
the standard assumptions, fi > 0, f2 < 0, f,, < 0, and fz2 < 0. In addition, we 
assume that investors cannot go short when investing in either sector - short 
sales would allow individuals to go short in one organizational form and long 
in the other, arbitraging the tax difference while facing risk only due to 6. 
Such tax arbitrage is not seen to our knowledge in practice. 
In equilibrium, the distribution of organizational forms that businesses 
choose should equal the distribution desired collectively by individual 
investors. In particular, businesses should allocate themselves across the 
alternative forms of organization in each industry until the market values the 
returns from a dollar of additional investment in each form at a dollar, i.e. 
when the marginal Tobin’s q equals one. In the theoretical derivation, we 
measure the returns relative to the cost of the underlying investment so as to 
impose the equilibrium condition that q equals one. 
How then do individuals facing tax rate mb divide their portfolios between 
corporate and noncorporate firms in industry i? Since the above assumptions 
are basically those of the capital-asset-pricing model, the first-order con- 
ditions characterizing the solution are standard. Starting from the indi- 
vidual’s equilibrium portfolio consider the effects of investing a dollar more 
in the corporate sector in industry i. If he already owns positive corporate 
equity, then by the envelope theorem he would be just indifferent to a 
further marginal investment; if he owns no such equity, then a marginal 
investment must be a net loss. After correcting for risk and taxes, the gain 
from a further corporate investment under the above assumptions, net of 
the alternative risk-free rate of return, would be measured by 
pi(l - rbi) + Xi - ((1 - mb)rr - g) - G, cov[(l - rbi)Fj + zi, &] ~0, 
(14 
where G, = -2f2/fi measures the individual’s degree of risk aversion. 
Similarly, the net gain from a further noncorporate investment would satisfy 
( Yi - C,)(l - rnb) + Xi - ((1 - m/Jr, - 7r) 
-G,cov[(l-VQ,)$+&++,?~]~O. (lb) 
If, in equilibrium, the individual invests in noncorporate but not corporate 
firms in industry i, then Eq. (lb) holds with equality and (la) with a strict 
inequality. Combining these two equations and simplifying we find that 
(rbi - mb)I Yi - G, cov( fi, ?,)I > (1 - m,)C, + G,&‘+f , (2) 
where the last term follows from our assumption that each < is uncorrelated 
with all other random variables in the model. In words, the left-hand side 
equals the certainty-equivalent tax savings from investing the funds in a 
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noncorporate rather than a corporate firm in industry i, while the right-hand 
side measures the expected nontax costs plus the extra risk-bearing costs of 
investing further in the noncorporate rather than the corporate sector. When 
the individual chooses not to invest at all in corporate firms in industry i, the 
tax savings must outweigh the nontax costs that result from an additional 
noncorporate investment. In contrast, if in equilibrium the individual invests 
in only corporate firms in the industry, then the sign of the inequality in Eq. 
(2) would be reversed and CUE, would equal zero in the equation. Eq. (2) 
would be satisfied with equality at the chosen aii if the individual invests in 
both corporate and noncorporate shares in industry i in equilibrium. 
A given investor will normally choose different organizational forms in 
different industries, and these choices will vary by investor. These results 
immediately follow from inspection of Eq. (2): 
(1) When the nontax or extra risk-bearing costs of noncorporate invest- 
ments are higher, fewer investors will invest in noncorporate firms. 
(2) Noncorporate firms in industries where the certainty-equivalent 
income is positive (negative) will be relatively most attractive to investors in 
the lowest (highest) tax brackets. Ownership of noncorporate firms with 
positive (negative) taxable income should therefore be concentrated among 
investors in relatively low (high) tax brackets. In combination, this implies 
that the fraction of assets held in noncorporate form by investors in tax 
bracket b will be a U-shaped function of the marginal tax rate in that tax 
bracket. 
(3) An increase in the_ absolute value of the certainty-equivalent taxable 
income p, - G, cov( Fi, Zb) makes noncorporate capital more attractive to 
investors, since tax savings for those who invest in such firms become larger 
relative to the nontax costs. Everything else equal, the result is a U-shaped 
relation between the certainty-equivalent taxable income generated in the 
industry and the fraction of the assets of the industry held in noncorporate 
form, a fraction we denote by Fi. 
To illustrate the second result, consider the special case in which fj 
generates no risk premium, the variance of the 6 are zero, for simplicity 
ebi = Bm, so does not vary by industry, and all the C, are positive.14 Given 
these assumptions, solve Eq. (2) for the personal tax rate, which we denote 
by mi, at which investors in industry i are indifferent to investing in 
corporate vs. noncorporate firms in that industry, yielding m, = (r$ - Ci)/ 
I4 When ?I has a positive risk premium, then the variation in G, and ?, across brackets 
complicates the story. (In our data, these risk premia are trivial in size.) If < is risky, then this 
risk limits the size of noncorporate holdings, and in general we cannot conclude that the 
fraction of holdings held in noncorporate form is U-shaped. If 0 varies with i or some C, are 
negative, then as an investor’s tax bracket rises, he may start purchasing noncorporate firms 
with tax losses before eliminating all holdings of noncorporate firms with profits, undermining 
the conclusion that the pattern of noncorporate holdings is strictly U-shaped. 
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% Noncorporate 
I I I 
v = T I l-e(k) mb 
Fig. 1. Relationship between personal tax rates and percentage of noncorporate assets in 
portfolio, for four industries. 0 = e,/m,, where eb is the effective personal tax rate on equity 
income (see text). 
[ r( 1 - 0( 1 - T)) - C,]. If yi - Ci is positive (negative), then all investors in a 
tax bracket higher (lower) than mi invest in corporate firms in industry i, 
and conversely. If all the Ci are positive, then investors in a range of 
personal tax brackets around r/[ 1 - 0( 1 - T)] will invest in only corporate 
firms. The farther is an investor’s tax bracket from this value in either 
direction, the larger the number of industries in which he will prefer 
noncorporate to corporate form. If there were four industries, then the 
fraction of assets held in noncorporate form as a function of mb should have 
the form illustrated in Fig. 1. 
These nonmonotonic relations between personal tax rates or taxable rates 
of return and the attractiveness of noncorporate investments make any 
analysis problematic that is based on average figures, such as those in 
Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989, 1990) or MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1991). 
3. Estimation of nontax benefits of incorporating 
3.1. Estimation strategy 
Our objective is to estimate the Ci. The basic strategy is to forecast the 
aggregate distribution of assets across organizational form by industry using 
the above model, given the actual data on wealth holdings across tax 
brackets and taxable rates of return by industry. These forecasts will be a 
function of the unobserved Ci. We then solve for those Ci that lead the 
model to forecast an aggregate distribution of assets across forms that 
matches the distribution observed in the actual data. 
To do this, we constructed a data set with most of the variables in the 
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model: Fj, r, r, mb, ebr, and the covariance structure of _?i. In addition to 
the C,, however, we also cannot directly observe the G, or the xi. Thus, in 
order to solve the model for the C,, we must simultaneously solve for the xi 
and G,. 
To do this, we start with the system of equations derived above that 
describes the equilibrium holdings of equity by industry and by organization- 
al form for investors in each tax bracket b. For any given values of the C,, 
G,, and xi, we can use expressions (la) and (lb), along with the 
nonnegativity constraints for equity holdings of each type, to solve for each 
investor’s pattern of holdings, CYST and aii. 
We then choose each G, so that the forecasted equity holdings (corporate 
and non-corporate) in that tax bracket equal the observed holdings in that 
bracket. Similarly, we choose each xi so that the forecasted holdings in that 
industry equal the observed holdings. Simultaneously, we choose the C, so 
that the forecasted noncorporate holdings in each industry match the 
observed noncorporate holdings. In particular, if W, denotes the observed 
holdings of equity by investors in tax bracket b, if Eni equals the observed 
aggregate holdings of noncorporate firms in industry i, and if E, equals the 
observed aggregate holdings (corporate and noncorporate) in industry i, 
then we have the following three sets of restrictions, which together help us 
forecast values for all the unobserved parameters: 
+ ati) = Ei , 
One of these M + 2N equations in system (3) is redundant, however, 
since it must be that ci E, = c, W,. As a final restriction, we require that 
the weighted average expected return on the market portfolio, denoted by 
R, be consistent with the historical evidence. To solve for the theoretical 
relation characterizing R, we first divide all terms in Eq. (la) by G, and sum 
over those tax brackets {bj} that own corporate equity in industry i, giving15 




Here, x = l/[C 
XV 
bE{bi)(l/Gbk m? =%[CbE{bi)(mb’Gb>13 and ‘T = 
beib,l(~bilGb)]. Let Eci = Ei - Ej, denote the value of corporate equity 
l5 We find below that in the data the risk premium for the ?! are trivial in size, so we ignore 
these terms in this expression. 
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in industry i. Then if we weigh Eq. (4) by Eci, sum over i, and divide 
through by ci Eci, we find that 
R z (c [(I - T;)Y, + ,]Eci)/F Eci = dl -m*) - 7T + n ’ 
I 
where m* = c i E,,m T / c i Eci and where L? is a similarly weighted average of 
the risk-premium terms in Eq. (4). Market data were used to estimate the 
right-hand side of Eq. (5),16 creating the final restriction needed to identify 
all the needed parameters. 
It should be noted that our results are not conventional econometric 
estimates with estimable standard errors. To begin with, all of our data 
series are estimated with some error, and then used to estimate the C, with 
zero degrees of freedom; we get a perfect ‘fit’. As a result, we are not in a 
position to report standard errors for our estimates. 
3.2. Data 
We require data for corporate expected returns (E), asset holding by 
industry and type of organization (Ei, Eni), wealth by tax bracket (W,), the 
covariance structure of equity returns, and various tax parameters. To 
construct these variables we use data from the U.S. IRS Statistics of Income 
files, the CRSP security price files, the Compustat corporate financial 
statement files, the U.S. Federal Reserve Flow of Funds accounts, and 
miscellaneous other sources. We describe the construction of our data in an 
unpublished appendix.” In this subsection we describe the nature of the 
data and some of the more important assumptions we had to make to 
construct our variables. 
Under U.S. tax law, the noncorporate sector comprises a diverse set of 
firms. Noncorporate firms with a single owner could report their income on 
Schedule C (proprietorship income), schedule E (rental income), or 
schedule F (farming income).** Noncorporate firms with multiple owners 
(partnerships) are reported separately on the tax forms. There is an 
additional form of organization in the United States, a subchapter-S 
corporation, which has limited liability but is taxed the same as other 
I6 We used historical data for r and n, and used our model to estimate m*. For the market 
risk premium, 0, we use an estimate of 6.8% that was reported in Table 4.5~ in Merton (1980), 
estimated over the period 1966-78. 
“This appendix, along with the final data set, is available on request. 
I8 Unfortunately, the IRS did not report information on schedule F income after 1980, so that 
our sample for the farming industry consisted of 1970 and 1972-80. 
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noncorporate forms.” Since they face the same tax treatment as noncorpo- 
rate firms, we include S corporations in the noncorporate sector. 
To construct our estimates of corporate expected returns (pi) and asset 
ownership (E,,, Ei), we relied primarily on data from the U.S. IRS Statistics 
of Income data files. This data source restricted our sample to the years 
1970, and 1972-86_” These publications report aggregate income statements 
and some balance sheet data for corporate and noncorporate firms. We are 
limited to l-digit industry data because greater disaggregation was not 
available for all organization types. 
From these data we imputed the market value of both the corporate and 
the noncorporate equity held each year by individuals. To do so, we started 
by constructing data on the aggregate market value of corporate and 
noncorporate equity. Several complications were faced in this initial step. 
First, market values of equity are observed only for publicly-traded corpora- 
tions. For other corporations and for partnerships, only the book value of 
equity used for accounting purposes is observed; here, we assumed that the 
ratio of the market value to the book value among these firms is the same as 
that for publicly-traded corporations in the same industry.21 
Since the corporate shares not held by other corporations own the entire 
corporate sector, the market value of the assets in the corporate sector 
should equal the value of these outside shares alone. To measure the value 
of outside shares, we estimated the size of the cross-holdings of equity 
among publicly traded corporations in each industry,22 then subtracted this 
value from the market value of all shares outstanding in each industry. 
(These corrected market value figures were used in the ratios described in 
the previous paragraph.) 
I9 S corporations face severe limits on the number and kind of owners they can have, 
however, limiting their economic importance. 
” Unfortunately, the government’s archive tape for 1971 was constructed improperly, making 
it unreadable. 
xl In some years, the partnership data includes book assets but not book equity. In these 
years, we interpolated figures for book debt by multiplying the observed interest payments in 
that year by the average ratio of book debt to interest payments in the adjoining years in that 
industry. For some noncorporate forms, only the income statement is observed; here, we 
assumed that the ratio of depreciation deductions to market value is the same as for 
publicly-traded corporations. In a few years, depreciation deductions were missing as well. In 
these cases, values were imputed using depreciation deductions in adjoining years. 
“Corporations own shares in other corporations both directly (e.g. shares in their sub- 
sidiaries) and indirectly (e.g. shares used to fund their defined-benefit pension plans). The value 
of shares held directly were estimated based on the dividends that corporations report 
receiving, under the assumption that the payout rate on these shares equals the aggregate 
payout rate in the industry as a whole. Estimates of the value of shares held in defined-benefit 
pension plans were constructed using data from the Federal Reserves’ Flow of Funds and from 
Kotlikoff and Smith (1983). 
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Our theory focuses on the allocation of shares taxable under the personal 
income tax. We used Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data to delete equity 
holdings not subject to the personal income tax, e.g. owned by foreigners or 
defined-contribution pension plans.23 We report the resulting estimates of 
the fraction of equity held in noncorporate form in each industry, Fi, 
averaged across the sample period, in column (1) of Table 1. We report the 
average value of F, in each year, averaged across industries, in column (1) of 
Table 2. 
Our next step was to calculate the expected taxable rates of return earned 
within the corporate sector, r,. For a given industry in a given year, we set 
Fi equal to the ratio of the total taxable income reported by corporations to 
our estimate of the total market value of corporate equity for these firms 
(before the above adjustments). Expected taxable rates of return, ?,, were 
then estimated based on a regression of the ex post values against lagged 
data.z4 The resulting estimates for yi by industry, averaged over the sample 
period, are reported in column (2) of Table 1. Overall, these estimates seem 
quite reasonable, except that for the mining industry.25 
We next constructed data on the total equity holdings, W,, of investors in 
each tax bracket b in each year, based on samples of individual tax returns 
in each year.26 For investors in each tax bracket, we had data on their 
dividends from corporate holdings, and their income from each type of 
noncorporate holdings (as reported on tax schedules C, E, and F). In each 
case, we allocated the aggregate market value for each type of asset held 
directly by individuals, as estimated above, across tax brackets in proportion 
to the income from that type of asset reported by individuals in that tax 
bracket .27 For W, we then summed the equity holdings of investors in tax 
bracket b. 
*3 Since this data source does not break down share holdings by industry, we had to assume 
that such holdings were fully diversified. 
24 We assumed an ARMA( 1,l) process for each of the variables being forecast, and included 
the lagged value of the rate of return for the entire corporate sector. In one case, the moving 
average term was not included because the estimate was outside the stable region. Our time 
series were too short to justify more complicated models. 
25 The several sharp jumps in oil and other mineral prices during our sample period resulted 
in large windfalls to this industry. 
26The data are from the IRS Individual Model Files. We thank the Center for Tax Policy 
Research at the University of Michigan for providing these data and assistance in using them. 
The number of individual tax returns in the sample each year ranged from about 70,000 to 
about 110,000. 
27This was done separately for income from corporate dividends, proprietorships, rental 
property, farms, and subchapter S corporations. For each noncorporate form of income, we 
estimated separately the value of equity in firms reporting losses vs. profits, and allocated each 
across tax brackets in proportion to the amount of losses (profits) from this noncorporate form 
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Table 2 





Max(pers. tax rate) Wtd. avg. 
minus noncorporate 




per $ of 
tax revenue 
(4) 
1970 0.23 0.22 0.0221 0.0935 
1972 0.31 0.22 -0.00889 0.00491 
1973 0.22 0.22 0.0297 0.0692 
1974 0.22 0.22 0.0380 0.0408 
1975 0.18 0.22 0.0634 0.103 
1976 0.22 0.22 0.0790 0.135 
1977 0.21 0.22 0.0500 0.0869 
1978 0.21 0.22 0.0541 0.0743 
1979 0.19 0.24 0.0612 0.0826 
1980 0.22 0.24 0.0751 0.168 
1981 0.22 0.24 0.0290 0.0686 
1982 0.18 0.04 0.0342 0.0919 
1983 0.21 0.04 0.0204 0.0896 
1984 0.21 0.04 0.0214 0.0689 
1985 0.27 0.04 -0.00244 0.0303 
1986 0.28 0.04 0.0171 0.174 
To calculate the risk premium for g in each industry, we first estimated 
the market /? for Fi in each industry by regressing ?i against the return on 
the S&P 500, using annual data for the period 1970-86.28 We then multiplied 
this estimate of p by Merton’s estimate for the risk premium on the market 
portfolio of 6.8%, in order to derive an estimate of the risk premium for Fi. 
The resulting certainty-equivalent values for the Fi, averaged over our 
sample period, are reported in column (3) of Table 1. 
Everything else equal, the theory forecasts that the fraction noncorporate 
in an industry should be a U-shaped function of the certainty-equivalent 
taxable income generated in that industry, with the minimum fraction 
noncorporate being in industries with no certainty-equivalent taxable in- 
come. Since almost all the certainty-equivalent values were positive, we 
simply tested to see whether there was a positive correlation between these 
values and Fi among those observations where the certainty-equivalent 
values were positive. The resulting correlation was in fact positive, but equal 
*’ The S&P 500 consists of large firms, but our theory assumes that investors hold diversified 
portfolios of both large and small firms. However, on an annual basis the S&P 500 returns is 
quite correlated with broader indices. Given the extremely small relationship we found between 
annual taxable income by industry, Y,, and the S&P 500 return, we do not expect the choice of 
index to have a significant effect on the results. 
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to only 0.016.29 This one-dimensional test ignores, however, variation in the 
Ci across industries, or variation in Ci, the tax law and the wealth 
distribution across time, or a systematic relationship between the risk 
aversion parameters G, and tax rates mb. 
Before proceeding, note in comparing columns (2) and (3) that there is 
almost no risk premium attributed to the taxable return ?i - almost the 
entire risk premium in corporate equity is attributed to the nontaxable 
component, $. For simplicity, in the rest of the analysis we will therefore 
assume that Yi is risk free, so that the certainty-equivalent value of Fi will 
be measured by fj. 
In order to estimate the various covariances in the model, we set fb equal 
to the investor’s tot+ return from corpor_ate and noncorporate equity, 
ci [c~$(Y~(l -Tag) + Xi) + ~ytJ<(l -_m,) + X, + <.)].3o We then estimated 
the covariances among the various Xi using data from the CRSP files on 
daily corporate rates of return. In doing so, we aggregated by industry and 
pooled data from the current and previous years. 
We saw no convincing way to estimate the size of the extra idiosyncratic 
variance, ~2, faced when investing in noncorporate shares. In most of our 
results, we simply assumed that noncorporate income was roughly twice as 
risky as corporate income. In particular, we set ut equal to the variance of 
the return on the market portfolio of corporate stocks, which we estimated 
to equal 0.034. As a sensitivity test, we also report some results where of is 
twice as large. 
For tax rates we used the statutory corporate and personal tax rates in 
effect for each year. Depending on the year, the number of personal tax 
brackets ranged from 24 (in 1982) to 46 (in 1972).31 The corporate tax rate is 
in fact graduated as well, with a lower rate on income below a certain 
threshold ($75,000 in 1985, for example). However, the rate of return data 
could not be constructed separately for each corporate tax bracket, so we 
use only the top corporate tax rate. Since the top rate begins at a rather low 
level of income we do not expect that ignoring the lower tax bracket has 
much significance for our results. We report the difference between the top 
personal and corporate tax rates as At in column (2) of Table 2. 
To calculate the effective combined marginal tax rate on corporate equity 
29 This correlation is calculated deleting the figures for the mining industry. Rates of return 
for mining during 1974-80 were such outliers that they dominated the results. 
JO In general, the probability distribution of future consumption ?, in Eqs. (la) and (lb) can 
be affected by many factors other than the returns on corporate and noncorporate equity 
owned directly, e.g. uncertain labor earnings or risk in the value of nonfinancial and other 
financial assets. We capture the effects of these other sources of risk only implicitly by choosing 
the value of G, to rationalize the observed portfolio choices. 
3’ A given individual faces far fewer potential tax brackets, but the schedules are different for 
various taxpayer categories (e.g. married, single, single head of household). 
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income, 76i, we take the dividend payout ratio in each industry i, denoted by 
di, to be an exogenous parameter, and measure it as the ratio of total 
dividends paid to taxable income in that industry, as reported in the IRS 
Statistics of Income tables. Then, to calculate the effective tax rate on the 
portion of equity income that is accrued as a capital gain, we first apply the 
statutory capital gains exclusion factor (50% before October 1975; 60% 
thereafter), which we denote by g. We then multiply by a factor a to convert 
the tax rate on realized gains into a tax rate on the present value of accrual 
equivalent gains. Following Feldstein et al. (1983), we set a equal to 0.25.32 
Thus, we calculate the effective personal tax rate on equity income as 
ebi = d,m, + (1 - di)gam,. 
3.3. Estimation results 
We now present the results from the estimation strategy described in the 
previous subsection,33 solving each year separately. Our estimates for Ci for 
each industry, averaged over time, are reported in column (4) of Table 1. 
Except for the figure for the mining industry, where taxable profits were 
incredibly high due to the windfalls during the 1970~;~~ these numbers look 
quite reasonable. Among the other industries, the annual expected nontax 
cost, Ci, of operating in the noncorporate form ranges from a high of just 
about 0.05 in the manufacturing, trade, and services industries to a low of 
-0.001 in the finance/insurance/real estate industry. Recall that the Ci are 
measured in the same units as rates of return on equity. Compared with our 
estimates of the expected taxable rate of return, Fi, or the estimate of about 
0.105 for the expected economic rate of return in the corporate sector found 
in Feldstein and Summers (1977), these figures are large in economic terms. 
The extra marginal costs from choosing a noncorporate form also include 
the extra risk-bearing costs, however. We calculated weighted averages of 
the extra risk-bearing costs, G,a,bicf, weighting the value in each tax 
32 In the United States the tax rate is reduced to zero if assets are held until the owner’s death 
or if donated to charity. 
33 Our first attempt to measure C, involved estimating the taxable rates of return within the 
noncorporate sector, ?: - C,, then subtracting these returns from those in the corporate sector 
to estimate Ci. Unfortunately, the resulting figures for Fi - C, were not credible. For example, 
the resulting estimate of the average yearly expected taxable rate of return in the noncorporate 
service sector during the sample period was 165%! The likely explanation is that noncorporate 
firms often choose to include labor income of the owners in their reported taxable income- 
doing so has only small tax consequences (through, for example, effects on social security and 
unemployment insurance payments) and may be useful for nontax reasons. 
34 Ignoring the years most affected by the ‘oil shocks’, 1974-80, the average Ci in mining was 
only 0.037. 
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bracket by its ownership share CY:~, and added these risk-bearing costs to the 
expected nontax costs, Ci. The resulting figures for the combined costs of 
choosing a noncorporate form are reported in column (5) of Table 1. 
Clearly the risk-bearing costs play a minor role, at least given the assumed 
values of the c:. To test the sensitivity of our results to the value of UT, we 
doubled the assumed values for the af to 0.068. The resulting cost estimates 
are reported in columns (6) and (7), and show little sensitivity to the 
assumed value of the (~2. This occurs in part because the greater riskiness of 
noncorporate investments is offset by the slightly smaller values of the Ci 
now needed to rationalize the observed choices. 
3.4. Discussion 
Ours is the first study of which we are aware that provides direct estimates 
of the size of nontax factors that affect the relative attractiveness of 
corporate and noncorporate organizational forms. To what extent are our 
estimates consistent with theoretical discussions? In two recent papers, 
Fama and Jensen (1983a,b) discuss the role of share liquidity for the choice 
of organizational form. They assume that equity in noncorporate firms, 
being much less liquid, ends up being owned primarily by close personal 
associates of those running the business. While concentrated ownership 
reduces problems arising from separation of ownership from control, it 
imposes higher risk-bearing costs and limits the amount of capital that can 
be raised easily. These costs should be higher in industries where firms are 
larger, making access to capital markets more important; they should also 
be higher in industries that face greater diversifiable risk, risk that should 
impose no real cost on (publicly traded) corporations but that will likely be 
costly for owners of noncorporate firms to bear. 
One clear piece of evidence on the importance of equity liquidity and 
ownership concentration is the relatively small size of the S corporation 
sector in the United States. S corporations have the same limited liability 
rules as do regular corporations, but the tax rules of a partnership. To 
qualify a firm must accept significant restrictions on the number and identity 
of shareholders. For example, under current law, there may be no more 
than 30 shareholders, none .of whom may be corporations or foreign 
citizens. Evidently these constraints on diversified ownership are quite 
costly; otherwise we would expect to see far more S corporations. 
To judge the consistency of our estimates with this theory, we regressed 
Ci against two variables intended to measure the value of capital market 
access and the costs of additional risk-bearing. The first, denoted by ui, is 
the average equity value per firm in the industry, including both noncorpo- 
rate and corporate firms, measured in billions of 1982 dollars. The larger is 
ui the more costly should be the lack of access to capital markets for 
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noncorporate firms, leading to a higher value of the nontax costs C, of 
operating in noncorporate form. The second variable, denoted by si, is the 
root-mean-squared-error from a regression each year of the daily rate of 
return of NYSE firms in industry i against the market rate of return3’ This 
variable measures the size of diversifiable risks in each industry; when these 
risks are more important, the noncorporate form should be less attractive, 
making C, larger. In fact, we found that 
Cj = 0.031 + O.O5Ou, + 0.68si , 
(0.014) (0.022) (1.71) (1) 
with an R2 of 0.05 and standard errors reported in parentheses. Both 
estimated coefficients have the expected sign, that for ui is statistically 
significant, and both are large in economic terms. An increase in ui by one 
standard deviation, for example, increases Ci by 0.016. The observed values 
of si are normally around 0.003 but range as high as 0.016, suggesting 
somewhat smaller but still important potential effects on Ci. 
Regulations are another factor that may affect the relative cost of 
corporate and non-corporate forms. In column (3) of Table 2, we report the 
weighted average estimate of Ci in each year, weighted by the equity 
outstanding in each industry. There were two important regulatory changes 
during this period. In 1976, ‘at-risk’ rules were introduced for partnerships 
to restrict the deductibility of losses, thereby making this noncorporate form 
less attractive. In addition, in 1982 several regulations affecting subchapter S 
corporations were relaxed, making this noncorporate form more attractive.36 
While the average values of Ci are higher in the last half of the 1970s and 
lower in the 1980s consistent with these forecasts, the change in each case 
appears to occur a year preceding the forecasted date. We also see a sharp 
growth in the size of & and a decrease in Ci starting in 1985, appearing to 
anticipate the tax changes that were enacted in 1986 affecting tax years 
starting in 1987.37 If firms face important costs of changing organizational 
form, then they would have an incentive to anticipate coming changes in the 
tax and regulatory code. Our observations suggest they in fact do so. 
35 Since we made no attempt to measure variation in 0; by industry our estimates for C, 
include any variation in risk-bearing costs across industries. 
36 There were also less important regulatory changes in 1973 and 1983. Neither was found to 
matter much in the tests reported in MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1991). Given our limited 
data, we restrict our discussion to the two major regulatory changes. 
” Certainly, the huge realizations of capital gains by individuals that occurred in 1986 would 
be consistent with this reading. 
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4. Implications of partnership tax treatment of corporate income 
Economists have long advocated eliminating the corporate tax and instead 
making each shareholder pay tax on his/her share of corporate income 
under the personal income tax.38 In many countries, this outcome is 
approximated through the use of dividend imputation schemes. 
In this section we use our model estimates to forecast the efficiency 
consequences of the changes in organizational form that would result from 
introducing such a tax reform in the United States. Specifically, we examine 
the alternative tax system under which corporate taxable income, r,, is 
taxed at the personal tax rate of the owner, mb, rather than at the corporate 
tax rate. Under such a tax system, following the logic used in deriving Eq. 
(2) we find that investors in tax bracket mb would invest in noncorporate 
firms unti139 
where the inequality would be strict when aii = 0. It follows immediately 
that there would be no investment in the noncorporate form in any industry 
i in which Ci > 0. If C, < 0, however, then each investor would choose (Y$ 
such that Eq. (2a) holds with equality. Any further investment in industry i 
would then be in corporate equityP’ 
We calculate the efficiency consequences of allocating an amount of 
capital Eni = c, (Y:~ to noncorporate rather than corporate firms by ag- 
gregating the changes in certainty-equivalent individual incomes plus the 
change in tax revenue. The drop in tax revenue plus the drop in expected 
income of individuals is measured simply by the aggregate nontax costs, 
E&, while the increase in aggregate risk-bearing costs is given by 
0.50: c, Gb(~ii)2. The drop in these combined costs, summed across 
38 For one such proposal, see McLure (1979). 
39 For simplicity, we assume here that corporate investment remains positive in each industry 
in equilibrium-when there is no corporate investment, Eq. (lb) would be used instead to 
determine the equilibrium value of ai,. We tested the importance of this simplification for the 
last few years of our sample, estimating the equilibrium portfolio choices for all investors, 
holding aggregate capital in each industry constant, and obtained quite similar results. 
40 Note that even under this tax system taxes affect the organizational form decision, 
discouraging use of the noncorporate form. This occurs due to our assumption that the gain 
from noncorporate investments (when C, is negative) is taxable, but that the offsetting cost due 
to the extra risk is not shared with the government. In principle, reallocating these idiosyncratic 
risks from noncorporate investments through the tax system could result in an efficiency gain, 
making noncorporate investment more attractive. Achieving this would require a more 
extensive tax reform than the one considered here, however. 
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industries, in response to the shift to partnership tax treatment of corporate 
income measures the efficiency gain from this tax reform resulting from the 
changes in organizational form per se.41 
We averaged the resulting figures across time for each industry and report 
them in column (8) of Table 1, and across industries for each year and 
report them in column (4) of Table 2. In order to aid in the interpretation of 
the resulting figures, we express them as a percent of the tax revenue that 
would have been collected had the entire industry been corporate.42 
Averaged across the full sample, the increase in efficiency due to changes in 
organizational form is only 8.7% of the initial tax revenue from these firms. 
This estimate seems quite consistent with the very limited responsiveness of 
organizational form decisions to taxes found by MacKie-Mason and Gordon 
(1991). Our estimates do differ dramatically by industry and fluctuate over 
time, suggesting the importance of omitted factors (some of which we 
discuss below). In farming, for example, before the tax reform on average 
87% of capital was invested in noncorporate firms. Since our estimate of Ci 
for this industry is positive in all but one year, except in that year all of these 
firms should choose to incorporate under the proposed tax reform according 
to the theory, resulting in an estimated efficiency gain which is one and a 
half times the revenue collected from this industry. 
The estimated efficiency cost is notably higher in three years: 1976, 1980 
and 1986. The jump in 1976 is primarily due to unusually high estimated 
nontax costs for the construction and services industries, due to high 
estimates for the pi in this year. This may simply reflect noise in our 
estimates for Fi. 
The high estimated efficiency costs in 1980 and 1986 are largely due to a 
sharp rise in the fraction noncorporate in each year. In each case, a tax 
reform went into effect the next year which lowered personal rates 
substantially relative to corporates rates, thereby making the noncorporate 
form more attractive. Investors appear to be changing their choices for 
organizational form in anticipation of these future tax changes, consistent 
with the presence of significant transaction costs of changing form. Since the 
noncorporate sector is larger under the distorting tax system, the efficiency 
cost of the tax distortions are estimated to be larger. 
We are aware of only one other published paper that provides measures 
41 Such a tax reform would affect aggregate efficiency in a variety of other ways. In 
particular, it would cause real capital to be reallocated across industries, cause a shift between 
investments in bonds vs. real capital, cause a change in the allocation of risks across tax 
brackets, and cause a change in total savings. We did not attempt to model the productive 
sector, savings behavior, or equilibrium output prices, so were not in a position to forecast 
these other efficiency implications of the tax reform. 
Q If actual corporate tax payments in year I in industry i were Ti,, then we projected that 
revenue would have been T,,/(l - Fi) had all firms in the industry been corporate. 
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of the efficiency costs from tax distortions to organizational form, by 
Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989). Their results are strikingly different: they 
estimate an efficiency gain from partnership taxation of about 120% of the 
tax revenue collected, versus our average 9% gain. Why are the results so 
different? 
The excess burden estimates can be approximated by -0.5 ci ti AE,,i, 
where t, is the initial tax distortion discouraging incorporation in the ith 
industry, and AE,, is the change in noncorporate holdings caused by the 
shift to a partnership tax treatment of corporate income. Both papers 
forecast that Eni =O under a partnership tax treatment of corporate 
incomeP3 While we calculate that historically the noncorporate sector has 
contained only about 20% of the capital stock, however, Gravelle and 
Kotlikoff (1989) assume that the noncorporate shares in their two industries 
are 98.3% and 37%, respectively, causing their estimate for AE,, to be two 
to five times as large as ours. In addition, they assume that personal tax 
liabilities are unaffected by the choice of organizational form, so that ti 
simply equals the corporate tax rate, 7. In contrast, our estimate of the tax 
distortion faced by the marginal firm choosing noncorporate form is [r + 
f3,m,(l - 7)] - mi, where m, is the tax bracket at which investors are just 
willing to buy some noncorporate shares in industry i. Not only is this 
distortion smaller than r, but by construction it is smaller particularly in 
those industries with large noncorporate shares, where we infer that mi must 
be close to T in order to explain the large size of noncorporate holdings in 
the industry. These smaller estimate for the ti explain most of the rest of the 
differences in the two sets of results. 
5. Possible biases in the estimates of Ci 
Many simplifying assumptions were used above in deriving estimates of 
the nontax costs of not incorporating. In this section we examine how our 
estimates are likely to change when some of these assumptions are relaxed. 
In some cases, tests for the size of possible biases are described, and at the 
end of the section we estimate their importance. 
5.1. Allowing for heterogeneity in Ci within an industry 
So far, we have assumed that the nontax costs, Ci, of noncorporate form 
are the same for all equity invested in a given industry. If C, varies across 
firms within an industry, then those firms with the lowest values of Ci would 
43 In our model, noncorporate firms would survive only in industries with negative estimates 
for C,, which occur primarily in the finance/insurance/real estate industry. 
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be the ones that become noncorporate. Our procedure would still estimate 
the correct value of Ci for the marginal noncorporate firm, but would 
overestimate the aggregate efficiency loss of the tax distortions to organiza- 
tional form, implying that our efficiency cost estimates are upper bounds. 
5.2. Assuming that the C, are tax-deductible 
We assumed in the model that the nontax costs of noncorporate form 
were tax-deductible. However, it is possible that some of the nontax costs 
may not be tax-deductible, e.g. they arise during bankruptcy proceedings 
when the firm has no taxable income in any case. To test the sensitivity of 
our results to this assumption, consider what happens if we make the 
opposite assumption that all Ci are nondeductible. Then if we denote our 
(incorrect) estimates above as Ci, and the correct estimates as CT, the 
relation between the two is given by44 
where Ni denotes the set of tax brackets in which investors own positive 
amounts of noncorporate equity in industry i. Our estimate, Ci, then 
overestimates the correct CT by a factor equal to a weighted average (over 
those who own noncorporate stock) of the individual tax factors, (1 - mb). 
5.3. Allowing for heterogeneity in yi 
Another implicit assumption made above is that all firms in a given 
industry earn the same taxable rate of return on their capital. Yet l-digit 
industries are very heterogeneous. For example, our estimates of pi were 
normally positive, yet certain subindustries, e.g. real estate and oil and gas 
drilling, have consistently generated negative taxable income, making them 
appropriate as investments for those in high tax brackets. Given hetero- 
geneity of yi within an industry, the noncorporate sector in each industry 
should be composed of those firms with either very positive or very negative 
values of Fi. 
Ignoring the possible presence of heterogeneity in x within an industry 
causes us to underestimate the value of C,. To see this, consider the case in 
which the average pi is positive. Given heterogeneity in yj, the value of yi 
for the marginal noncorporate firm owned by low-tax-bracket investors in 
44 We assume here that Eq. (2) is satisfied with equality for all investors who own 
noncorporate stock. The expression for the c: becomes messier, but should not change much 
quantitatively, if this is not true. 
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theory should exceed that for any remaining corporate firm. Yet we used the 
mean value for F, among corporate firms in estimating C,, and a smaller 
value of r, leads to a smaller estimate of Ci. In addition, when some 
noncorporate firms are in fact owned by those in high tax brackets, fewer 
noncorporate firms are owned by low-tax-bracket investors than we esti- 
mate, requiring an increase in C, to rationalize this outcome. 
5.4. Differences in reported income of corporate and noncorporate firms 
So far, we have assumed that a firm’s taxable income is unchanged if it 
changes its organizational form, other than due to the extra real costs, Ci, of 
operating in noncorporate form. Reported taxable income can change for 
other reasons, however. 
To begin with, income reported by noncorporate firms may well include 
labor as well as capital income earned by the proprietors/partners. Since the 
two are treated the same for tax purposes, the presence of labor income 
does not affect the theoretical story, though it convinced us not to make use 
of the noncorporate income data. 
In addition, corporations have some ability to shift reported income 
between the firm and its employees and between the firm and its sharehol- 
ders, so as to reduce their combined tax payments. Loans from the party 
facing the low tax rate to the party facing the high tax rate would be one 
device that can be used for this purpose. These tax gains from income 
shifting were ignored in the above derivation, causing us to overestimate the 
size of C,. The resulting bias to our estimate of C, should be larger the larger 
the absolute value of the difference between the corporate rate and the 
personal rates faced by employees and shareholders. To test for this bias, we 
measured the tax difference by At = abs(T - max(m,)), on the assumption 
that corporate shareholders and top executives are primarily in the top tax 
bracket, and examine below its relation to our estimates of C,. 
Another source of potential bias arises from differences in the explicit tax 
provisions affecting corporate vs. noncorporate firms. Corporations, for 
example, face more liberal rules affecting the payment of tax-free fringe 
benefits to their employees. Everything else equal, this provision makes the 
corporate form more attractive, again creating an upward bias in our 
estimate of C,. 
5.5. No-loss-offset provisions 
In the above analysis we assumed implicitly that firms would receive tax 
refunds if their taxable income were negative in a year. Technically, this is 
not allowed for any firm. Noncorporate owners, however, can use other 
income to offset losses, while corporations with losses can merge with 
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corporations with profits. Both can carry any excess losses forward to offset 
income in future years. Neither strategy is equivalent to full-loss offset, 
however. 
To the extent that a firm faces a binding restriction on the deductibility of 
its losses, then its marginal tax rate is zero rather than the statutory rate. 
Since corporations are more likely to face such binding restrictions, given 
that noncorporate owners can deduct losses against other income, our 
procedure likely underestimates the tax advantage of the noncorporate form 
for firms with tax losses, and therefore underestimates Ci. In years when tax 
losses are important, this bias should be larger. To test for this, we examine 
below the relation between Ci and the fraction of capital in an industry each 
year owned by firms earnings tax losses, a fraction we denote by Lip5 
5.6. Transactions costs when firms change organizational form 
Our model of the choice of organizational form for a firm is entirely static, 
and so we implicitly assumed no tax or nontax costs of changing organiza- 
tional form. There are clearly tax implications, however, of changing 
organizational form. In particular, all accrued capital gains must be realized 
and taxes paid on them when a firm shifts from corporate to partnership 
formP6 While new firms are not affected directly by these provisions, they 
would take into account the possible desire to change organizational forms 
in the future when deciding initially what form to choose. These penalties 
for changing organizational form should therefore reduce the extent to 
which firms respond to temporary tax changes, and slow the aggregate 
response even to permanent changes. When the size of the noncorporate 
sector is increasing, this increase would be slower than we forecast, causing 
us to overestimate the size of C,, and conversely when the noncorporate 
sector is shrinkingP7 We therefore expect a positive relation between Ci and 
AFi, and test for this below. 
Recapture provisions and other transactions costs can also complicate the 
analysis for firms that face changing tax liabilities over time even if the tax 
law is unchanging. An example would be a firm engaged in oil exploration, 
with heavy drilling and development expenses for its first few years of 
operations, and no taxable income until recovered oil is sold on the market. 
Such a firm would have negative values for pi during these initials years, and 
45 To the extent that corporate and noncorporate firms face similar difficulties in deducting 
losses, our estimates of C, would be less systematically biased, so should be less affected by 
variation in the Lz. 
46 No such provisions apply if the corporation instead shifts to a subchapter-S corporate form. 
” In principle, if these costs are larger for shifts from corporate to noncorporate form than 
for shifts in the reverse direction, then the former shifts should occur even more slowly. 
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positive values later when the oil is marketed. If there were no transactions 
costs, then the firm would change organizational form over time, based on 
the size of y, at each date. In fact, this has been the practice in the oil and 
gas drilling sector - these firms generally start as partnerships and incorpo- 
rate once their income turns positive. This behaviour is also commonly 
observed among new firms, which generally face tax losses during their first 
few years of existence and taxable profits later. 
If transactions costs are important, however, then firms should consider 
the tax implications of their choice of organizational form over a longer time 
horizon. To the extent that Fj or the tax law changes within this horizon, 
then expectations of future values affect current decisions, complicating the 
analysis. 
5.7. Regression results 
On the basis of the above discussion, we expect C, to be larger when At is 
large (corporations then have more opportunity for tax arbitrage), when AF, 
is large (due to adjustment costs, the corporate sector remains larger than it 
would be otherwise when the noncorporate sector is growing, implying a 
larger estimate of C,), and when L, is small (corporations have more 
difficulty taking full advantage of tax losses). In addition, ui and si should 
both have positive effects on Ci based on the Fama-Jensen discussion. 
Finally, the regulatory changes discussed above lead to the forecast that C, 
should go up starting in 1976, and should drop starting in 1982. To test for 
this, we include two dummy variables: one that equals one from 1976 on and 
zero otherwise, and a second that equals one starting in 1982. 
We report the resulting coefficient estimates in Table 3. The coefficients 
on AF, and At, have the wrong sign, but are very imprecisely estimated. All 
of the other coefficients have the expected signs. The coefficients of ui and si 
Table 3 
Estimated biases in calculation of non-tax cost of noncorporate form 
Dependent variable: estimates of non-tax cost, C, 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-ratio P > Itl 
Equity/firm, u, 0.0748 0.025 2.987 0.004 
Loss fraction, L, -0.0346211 0.0722149 -0.479 0.633 
Change in fraction noncorp., AF, -0.0005397 0.0864309 -0.006 0.995 
Tax spread, At -0.8624618 0.960033 -0.898 0.371 
Regime 2,1976- 0.0401619 0.0179313 2.240 0.027 
Regime 3,1982- -0.215307 0.1839948 -1.170 0.245 
Diversifiable risk, s, 1.819956 2.09319 0.869 0.387 
Intercept 0.212557 0.2099582 1.012 0.314 
Notes: The regression has 114 observations, one for each of eight industries for each of the 
16 years 1970-86 (except 1971). The R2 was 0.19. 
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are now larger and more significant than in the earlier regression. The 
dummy variables capturing regulatory changes both have coefficients that 
are large in magnitude, suggesting that such regulatory changes can have 
powerful effects on incentives. For example, while the raw mean of C, over 
time was 0.047, the coefficients imply that the regulatory changes in 1976 
increased its value by 0.04 whereas those in 1982 led to a large dropP8 
While the three coefficients capturing possible biases all have the right 
sign, none is near to being statistically significant and none has coefficients 
that are large enough to be of economic interest, giving us more confidence 
in our estimates of Ci. Several possible sources of bias were not tested for, 
however. 
6. Conclusions 
The differential tax treatment of corporate and noncorporate income 
under existing U.S. law creates an incentive for firms with extreme taxable 
rates of return to become noncorporate and be owned by investors in 
extreme personal tax brackets. In particular, investors in high tax brackets 
face a tax incentive to invest in noncorporate firms generating tax losses (tax 
shelters), so that the tax losses can be deducted against the top personal tax 
rates rather than against the lower corporate rate. Similarly, investors in low 
tax brackets have an incentive to own noncorporate firms generating 
substantial taxable income, so that this income is taxed at these low personal 
rates rather than at the higher corporate rate. The degree to which firms 
choose not to incorporate, to obtain these potential tax savings, depends on 
the size of any nontax costs (benefits) of organizing a firm in noncorporate 
form. 
We estimated the size of nontax costs needed to reconcile the observed 
fraction of firms choosing the noncorporate form with the fraction that 
would be forecasted to do so by the theory. On average the estimated 
nontax costs were sizable, equaling each year roughly 3.8% of a representa- 
tive firms’ equity value. The size of these nontax costs varied substantially 
by industry, however. As forecast by Fama and Jensen (1983a,b), the 
nontax costs of operating in noncorporate form tended to be larger in 
industries where firms are riskier and where firms need to raise more capital 
from the market. The size of these nontax costs also varied substantially 
over time as would be expected given the changing regulatory treatment of 
corporate and noncorporate firms. 
4* The estimated of drop of -0.22 is in itself implausible, though insignificant. As can be seen 
from Table 2, the Regime 3 dummy is very highly correlated with the variable At,, so that the 
coefficients of these two variables cannot be estimated reliably. 
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In spite of the large average size of these nontax costs, the efficiency gains 
from removing the differential tax treatment appear to be small. The 
estimated efficiency gains from changes in organizational form upon shifting 
to a partnership tax treatment of corporate income equal only about 9% of 
initial business tax payments. This occurs because noncorporate firms are 
concentrated in industries where nontax costs appear to be low. Our 
estimate seems quite consistent with the very limited responsiveness of 
organizational form decisions to taxes found by MacKie-Mason and Gordon 
(1991), and is in sharp contrast to the efficiency gain of roughly 120% of tax 
revenue estimated by Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989). 
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